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[So F. No. 18818. In Bank.

Oct. 23, 1953.]

GINO GUIDI, Appellant, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA
et al., Respondents.
[1] State of California-Tort Liability.-The state and its instrumentalities and subdivisions are not immune from liability for
torts committed while engaged in proprietary or business
activities. (Gov. Code, § 16041.)
[2] Id.-Tort Liability.-Governmental immunity from liability
for torts tUrns on nature of particular activity that leads to
plaintiff's injury, not on identity of governmental subdivision
or agency carrying on activity or on fact that the facility in
question may also be used for governmental purposes.
[3] Id.-Tort Liability.-In action against state and State Agricultural Society for injuries sustained by patron at state fair
when he was knocked down and trampled on by a horse which
had been frightened by fireworks exhibition, reviewing court
is not concerned with possible immunity of state from liability
for negligence in connection with agricultural and educational
activities at fair, but only with sta.te's claim of immunity for
negligence in course of setting off fireworks and maintaining
horse arena. (Disapproving Dillwood v. Biecks, 42 Cal.App.
602, 184 P. 35, insofar as it holds that counties may act only
in a governmental capacity.)
[4] Id.-Tort Liability.-The state is acting in a proprietary
capacity when it enters into activities at state fair to amuse
and entertain the public, such as maintenance of a horse arena
and exhibition of fireworks, and neither '"it nor State Agricultural Society is immune from liability for injuries sustainc(l
by patron at fair when he was knocked down and trampled
on by a horse which had been frightened by fireworks exhibition; hence it is error for trial court to conclude that consent
statute does not allow maintenan~e of action for damages for
[1] See Cal.Jur., State of California, § 37 et seq.; Am.Jur., States,
Territories and Dependencies, §§ 73, 75 et seq.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-4] State of California, § 57.
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luch injuries. (Disapproving MeZvin v. State, 121 Cal. 16,
22, 53 P. 416, indicating that State Agricultural Society engages in governmental activities only in conducting state fair.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. William T. Sweigert,
Judge. Reversed.
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained by
patron at state fair. Judgment for defendants reversed.
.Remington Low, Clarence B. Knight and Sydney F. DeGoff for Appellant.
Dana, Bledsoe & Smith and Joseph W. Rogers, Jr., for
Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J .-Plaintiff Gino Guidi brought this aetion
against the State of California, the State Agricultural Society,
and several individual defendants, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained at the state fairgrounds in Sacramento. The trial court granted the motion of the state and
the society for judgment on the pleadings, on the ground
that the state fair is operated in the state's governmental
capacity and that the state and society are therefore immune
from suit. Plaintiff appeals from the ensuing judgment in
favor of the state and the society.- We have concluded that
the defense of governmental immunity from liability for tort
is not available to the state and the society, and that the judgment must therefore be reversed.
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint: Defendant State Agricultural Society plans, holds, and controls the state fair at
Sacramento. At all relevant times, defendant Golden State
Fire Works Company was the servant, agent, and employee
of defendant State of California, and defendant Douglas
Robb was the servant, agent, and employee of defendants
L. D. Lockwood and Jane Doe Lockwood. On September 3,
1950, plaintiff paid for his admission to the state fair and
entered the fairgrounds. The accident occurred while he was
·The record doel not reveal the present statUI of plaiDtiff'l action
againlt the other defendants. The judgment m favor of the State of
California and the State Agricultural Society is :final as to them, how·
ever, and il appealable whether or not the aetion agamst the other defendants is still pending. (BOCOG v. Bteinmet., 189 Cal. ~6, 428 [208
P.964].)
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standing near the entrance to the horse show arena. In his
first cause of action, he alleges that defendants State of California, State Agricultural Society, and Golden State Fire
Works Company "so carelessly and negligently controlled,
operated, supervised and maintained the said fairgrounds and
the fire works exhibition at said Fair" that a certain horse,
"Murietta Surprise," owned by defendants L. D. Lockwood
and Jane Doe Lockwood, "became frightened and was caused
to, and it did, run into, knock down and trample the plaintiff," causing severe personal injuries. The second cause of
action follows the allegations of the first cause of action, and
alleges in addition that defendants State of California and
State Agricultural Society "carelessly and negligently failed
to maintain the safeguards to protect the public, including
the plaintiff, from the animals stabled, exercised, led and
ridden" in the vicinity of the horse arena, so that "Murietta
Surprise" was permitted and allowed to knock down and
trample plaintiff. The third cause of action follows the
allegations of the first cause of action, and alleges in addition that defendants L. D. Lockwood, Jane Doe Lockwood,
and Douglas Robb "so carelessly and negligently controlled
and maintained" the horse that it became frightened and
was caused and permitted to run into and trample plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleged compliance with the claim statute. (Gov.
Code, § 16044.)
[1] The state and its instrumentalities and subdivisions
are not immune from liability for torts committed while engaged in proprietary or business 'activities, (Gov. Code,
§ 16041; People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.2d 754, 761-762
[178 P.2d 1] ; Muses v. Housing Authority, 83 Cal.App.2d
489, 502 [189 P.2d 305].) In the present case, it appears
from the complaint that one or both of two activities conducted
by the state or its agents led to plaintiff's injuries: the
exhibition of fireworks and the maintenance of the horse
arena. The only question to be determined on this appeal is
whether as a matter of law such activities are governmental.
Defendants contend that the state fair is organized and
operated solely to interest and educate the general public
in agricultural and industrial subjects, a governmental
activity, and that the maintenance of the horse arena and
exhibition of the fireworks are likewise governmental activities since they are connected with the operation of the fair.
[2] Governmental immunity, however, turns on the nature
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of the particular activity that leads to the plaintiff's injury,
not on the identity of the governmental subdivision or agency
carrying on the activity, or on the fact that the facility in
question may also be used for governmental purposes. (Chafor
v. City of Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478, 488 [163 P. 670, Ann.
Cas. 1918D 106, L.R.A. 1917E 685] ; Rhodes v. City of Palo
Alto, 100 Cal.App.2d 336, 341 [223 P.2d 639]; Boothby v.
Town of Yreka City, 117 Cal.App. 643, 651 [4 P.2d 589];
Bertiz v. City of Los Angeles, 74 Cal.App. 792, 797 [241 P.
921].) Thus, in PeopZe v. 8uperior Court, supra, 29 Cal.2d
754, we held that the State Belt Railroad was operated by the
State Harbor Commission in a proprietary capacity, although
that agency prevented and extinguished fires on the waterfront in its governmental capacity. (29 Cal.2d at 760.)
[3] Similarly, in the present case we are not concerned
with the possible immunity of the state from liability for
negligence in connection with agricultural and educational
activities at the state fair, but only with its claim of immunity
for negligence in the course of setting off fireworks and main·
taining the horse arena.
Most of the decisions relied upon by defendants are factually dissimilar to the present case. Two decisions, however, require discussion. In Melvin v. 8tate (1898),121 Cal.
16 [53 P. 416], a spectator at a horse race at the state fair in
Sacramento was injured by the collapse of the grandstand
owing to the negligent maintenance thereof by the State
Agricultural Society. It was held that plaintiff could not
bring an action against the state. The accident took place,
however, in 1891, two years before the passage of the consent
statute relied upon by plaintiff in the present case. (Stats.
1893, p. 57; now Gov. Code, § 16041.) Since it bad previously
been held that the consent statute was not retroactive (Chapman v. 8tate, 104 Cal. 690, 693 [38 P. 457. 43 Am.St.Rep.
158] ), the Melvin decision did not decide whether an action
could be maintained thereunder (People v. Superior Court,
supra,29 Cal.2d 754, 759; Talley v. Northern 8an Diego Hosp.
Dist., ante, pp. 33, 36-37 [257 P.2d 22]) and. accordingly,
is not controlling here. Defendant also relies on DiUwood
v. Riecks (1919),42 Cal.App. 602 [184 P. 35]. There, plaintiff's horse was destroyed by a fire at a stable on county
fairgrounds. through the negligence of county employees.
Plaintiff contended that the county operated the fairgrounds
in its proprietary capacity, relying upon 01wfor v. Oit" of
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Long Beach, supra, 174 Cal. 478. The court held that the
county could not act in a proprietary capacity, on the ground
that "counties being but agencies of the state, their functions
are exclusively governmental and are such only as are imparted to them by the state." (42 Cal.App. at 608.) The
Dillwood case is directly contrary to our decision in People
Y. Superior Court, supra, 29 Ca1.2d 754, where we held that
the state and, necessarily, its subdivisions, may act in a proprietary capacity. (See, also, Muses v. Housing Authority,
supra, 83 Cal.App.2d 489, 502.) The Dillwood case is disapproved insofar as it holds that counties may act only in a
governmental capacity.
In several cases municipal corporations either engaged in
activities for the amusement and recreation of their citizens
or allowed their property to be used for such purposes, and
it was held that they acted in a proprietary capacity. Thus,
in Chafor v. City of Long Beach, supra, 174 Cal. 478, the
city authorized free use of the municipal auditorium by the
Sons of St. George to celebrate Queen Victoria's birthday.
The public was invited. A parade led by the municipal band
terminated at the auditorium. The approach to the auditorium
collapsed under the weight of the crowd seeking admission
to attend further festivities. Similarly, in Sanders v. City
of Long Beach, 54 Cal.App.2d 651 [129 P.2d 511], the same
auditorium was used by the city to advertise itself and enter·
tain the public during "Know Your City Week" by giving
information concerning the various activities of departments
of the city. Plaintiff was injured while attending motion.
pictures at a room in the auditorium. Again, in Rhodes v.
City of Palo Alto, 100 Cal.App.2d 336 [223 P.2d 639], the
city recreotl.tion department operated a community theater
in a public park for the entertainment of its citizens. Plaintiff was injured while attending the reading of a play at
the theater.
[4] In our opinion, the Chafor, Sanders, and Rhodes
cases, supra, are controlling here, and require the conclusion
that the state is acting in a proprietary capacity when it enters
into activities at the state fair to amuse and entertain the
public. The activities of defendants do not differ from those
of private enterprise in the entertainment industry. As in
People Y. Superior Court, supra, the state, by its agents,
committed the tort while engaged in a proprietary activity,
and the trial court therefore erred in concluding that the
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oonsent statute did not allow maintenance of the action. The
statements in Melvin v. State, supra, 121 Cal. 16, 22, indicating that the State Agricultural Society engages in governmental activities only in conducting the state fair are inconsistent with the foregoing cases and are disapproved.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J .• and
Spence, J., concurred.
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